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FREEDOM OF SPEECH ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
Buckley v. Meng
280 N.Y.S2d 924 (1962)
Mr. William Buckley, the editor of National Review, sponsored a
lecture in the auditorium of Hunter College, a municipal college of the City
of New York. The talk urged people to support the movemdnt to keep
Algeria French. Some of those opposed to this view picketed the meeting.
Afterwards, Mr. Buckley was informed by officials of the college that he
would no longer be permitted to use the campus facilities. The restriction
was based on the college policy of prohibiting programs which were not
compatible with the aims of Hunter College as an institute of higher learn-
ing.1
The New York Supreme Court held that the regulations governing the
use of the college facilities were either unconstitutionally vague or else they
involved a denial of equal protection of the law to Mr. Buckley. In either
case, they were invalid and the college was ordered to enact new regulations
with all due speed.2
Ordinarily, the "void for vagueness" doctrine is applied in cases in-
volving conviction under a criminal statute.3 In such a situation the court
is concerned that the defendant did not have fair warning that his conduct
was prohibited. Even though the state may have authority to prohibit
certain activity, to comply with procedural due process it must give notice of
what is forbidden in order that a person can conform to what is required.
It will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an indictment
for the unwise exercise of his . . .knowledge involving so many
factors of varying effect that neither the person to decide in
advance, nor the jury to try him after the fact, can safely and
certainly judge the result.4
1 Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 927-28 (Sup. Ct. 1962). National Review
and its predecessor had sponsored an annual series of lectures at Hunter College since
1954. After the 1960 lecture, the Dean of Administration wrote Mr. Buckley and asked
him for a copy of his introductory remarks at the meeting. In a letter of January 12, 1961,
the Dean wrote Mr. Buckley informing him he could no longer lease the Hunter audi-
torium, since he felt the Review was "a political group presenting a distinct point of view
of its own."
In April 1961 the President of the College wrote Mr. Buckley saying: "These halls
are not available for political or other public movements or groups in presenting a
distinct position or point of view opposed by substantial parts of the public."
In June 1961 the Administrative Committee of the College issued a statement of
policy concerning the use of its facilities.
The court ignored the fact that the regulation on which the College based its denial
was published after the denial was made (at 930, note 1).
2 Id. at 935.
3 See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1958); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1937).
4 Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927).
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In this case Mr. Buckley was not in danger of being prosecuted for
conduct which he might reasonably believe permissible. He was specifically
informed that he was no longer permitted to use the facilities of Hunter
College. However, lack of warning is not the only vice in an indefinite
standard and the court has struck down regulations where lack of notice
was not involved.6
The standard "compatible with the aims of Hunter College" was so
broad that a reviewing court could rarely find an abuse of discretion.6
Where freedom of speech is involved, a licensing requirement will not be
upheld unless the standards governing the issuance of the license are so
clear that they preclude arbitrary action.7
An indefinite standard causes unnecessary work for the courts. If the
administrator has authority to make unconstitutional restrictions, litigation
will result which could have been avoided. In addition, the court, in order
to avoid an unconstitutional application of the regulation, would have to
define its limits by a case by case method.8
The legislature is better equipped to determine which conduct shall
be permitted and the judiciary should oppose any attempted delegation of
such authority to it.
Allowing the college administrators discretion in prohibiting speakers on
the campus runs contrary to the notion that in this country the people are
governed by laws and not by men.9 Due process requires the adjudication
of an individual's rights and duties to be governed by rules sufficiently
definite to guard against an arbitrary result.' 0 A rule of law is particularly
desirable where, as here, the decision-maker is insulated from public reaction.
If regulations are made by a politically responsible body the people can
attempt to redress any denial of freedom by exercising their right to vote."
However, the public has little or no control over the actions of college
officials.
In cases where socially desirable conduct, such as freedom of expression,
is involved there is an additional consideration. The very existence of the
5 Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Burstyne v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
6 Buckley v. Meng, supra note 1, at 930.
7 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 267 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290
(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
8 "The Void for Vagueness Doctrine," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 80-81 (1960).
9 See Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 202 (1959).
10 "The vice to be guarded against is arbitrary action by officials. The fact that in a
particular instance an action appears not arbitrary does not save the validity of the
authority under which the action was taken." Frankfurter, J., concurring in Niemotko
v. Maryland, supra note 7, at 385.
11 This ensures that the rights of the majority will be protected. It still may fall
upon the courts to protect the rights of the minority. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified
School District, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
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regulation, plus the method in which it was applied in Mr. Buckley's case,'12
would have an inhibiting effect on the dissemination of ideas.' 3 Persons who
desired to use the facilities in the future would tend to avoid discussion of
any controversial subject while on the campus. Speakers who wished to
espouse a theory which was not in harmony with the views of the majority
would be faced with the threat of being banned in the future.
The alternative holding, that, as applied in this case, the regulations
denied Mr. Buckley the equal protection of the law, is made clear by other
programs which the college found permissible. A celebration of the inde-
pendence of new African nations and a commemoration of the political
revolt in Hungary were both sanctioned. To hold that these were compatible
with the aims of Hunter College and that a speech on keeping Algeria French
is not, suggests that the distinction either had no rational basis, or was based
on the personal bias of the administrator. In either event it is uncon-
stitutional.' 4
Assuming that the reason behind the refusal to let Mr. Buckley use the
facilities was to prevent a possible breach of peace, the result seems obvious.
Where the possibility of disorder results from the action of those who are
opposed to the views presented in an attempt to silence the speaker, the
state has a duty to protect the speaker to the fullest extent possible.' 5 They
should not let the mob control what is to be said.' 6 On the other hand, if
the speaker attempts to arouse a sympathetic audience to action' 7 or engages
in language deliberately insulting and inciting, so-called "fighting words,'1 8
the police not only may, but should, stop him before harm is done. There
is nothing which indicates that speakers sponsored by Mr. Buckley would
be involved in either of these latter two forms of conduct.
Another possible reason for the regulations might be to uphold the
"good name or the academic prestige of the college.", 9 Although in some
12 See note 1 supra. The Dean requested a copy of Mr. Buckley's introductory
remarks. After reading them he determined that Mr. Buckley should not be permitted to
use the College facilities again.
13 Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
14 16A, CJ.S. Constitutional Law § 505 (1956). "Legislation must not make any
arbitrary or unreasonable distinctions." Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ; Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Van Alstyne, "Political Speakers at State Universities,"
3 U. Pa. L. Rev. 328, 337-9 (1963).
15 Gellhorn, American Rights, 61 (1960); Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Rockwell v. Morris, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1961). "[I]f the speaker incites others to
immediate unlawful action he may be punished... but this is not to be confused with
unlawful action from others who seek unlawfully to suppress or punish the speaker."
16 "The constitutional rights of the Respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded
to the violence and disorder which has followed upon the actions of the Governor and
Legislature." Cooper v. Aaron, supra note 14, at 14.
17 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
18 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
19 The statement of policy, supra note 1, made this one of the criteria. The vice of
vagueness would also be present here.
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circumstances this may be a proper reason for regulation,2 0 it seems doubtful
that it is sufficiently important to warrant suppression of free discussion.
A restriction on speech will be struck down unless it is imposed for some
substantial public purpose.2 ' In other cases the court has refused to uphold
limitations on first amendment freedoms designed to protect private prop-
erty,22 prevent littering of the streets,23 protect the peace and quiet of
households,24 and to instill patriotism in school children.25
An argument which was not made26 was that the school had the
authority to bar Mr. Buckley under the doctrine of in loco parentis.27 Under
this theory the college stands in the place of the parent while the child is
away at school.28 If the parents had a chance to make their wishes known
to the school, 29 so that the school authorities could follow their wishes in
granting or denying permission to attend events, this argument would seem
much stronger.30 It seems doubtful, however, that the authority could be
exercised over the students who were married or over twenty-one, since the
parents themselves would have no control over them. Even if the regulation
were properly phrased and limited, it might be found invalid on the ground
that the same ends could be achieved by less restrictive measures. 31 The
speaker could be allowed on campus with student attendance limited to those
20 Tanton v. McKinney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924) (Expulsion of female
student from a state teacher's college was upheld.)
21 Note "Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity," 65 Yale L.J. 1159, 1173 (1956).
22 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
23 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937).
24 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
25 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
26 And possibly could not have been made since there is nothing to show that
students were invited or even permitted to attend the meeting.
27 But see Van Aistyne, "Procedural Due Process and State University Students,"
10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 368, 376 (1963). "The common assertion that the University's extraor-
dinary power is one entrusted to it by the parents of its students is utterly unsubstantiated
and probably untrue. Certainly it is difficult to imagine that parents either demand or
expect that metropolitan state universities, with their large student bodies of ten thousand,
twenty thousand and more, the majority of whom reside off campus, should stand in the
place of the parents and closely supervise their children."
28 This would be in addition and supplementary to the interest of the state in pro-
tecting the children. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which upheld
a statute which said no boy under twelve or girl under eighteen should sell periodicals
on the street.
29 For example, by filling out a form to be returned with the student's schedule
cards, indicating whether their child was permitted to attend: extra-curricular talks on
all matters; talks on those matters concerning their academic field; ... no extra-curricular
talks.
30 But see, Christian v. Jones, 211 Ala. 161, 100 So. 99 (1924), which upheld expul-
sion of a pupil who left school during school hours, with the permission of her mother,
to take a music lesson from a private teacher.
31 Frantz, "The First Amendment in the Balance," 71 Yale L.J. 1524, 1449, n.10S
(1962).
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having permission of their parents and those who are no longer under
parental authority.
Despite petitioner's reputation, the decision in Buckley, standing alone,
does not seem worthy of special attention. The fact that the action of an
administrative official of a public school may be considered the action of
the state32 or that freedom of speech is to be protected against state33 as
well as federal action is no longer open to question. There was no "captive
audience" present and thus no problem about a person's right not to listen34
and the case did involve a "prior restraint," which is much less apt to be
upheld than a post-speech punishment.3 5 The interests of the college deemed to
require the regulations seem clearly insufficient in view of prior holdings. 36
The fact that the restricted speech was to occur on a college campus,
rather than on a public street or in a public park, may be relevant,37 but
where the facilities have been opened to the public any principle of selection
must have a rational basis, or run afoul of the equal protection clause.38
Although the impact at being denied the opportunity to speak on cam-
pus is not as great as that which would occur if he were prevented from
speaking in a city,39 the type of person refused would probably have an
equally difficult time obtaining private facilities for his talk.40 Regulation
of speech will not ordinarily be upheld unless there is some reasonable
alternative means of reaching the public with all points of view.
41
The holding in Buckley may be significant, however, in light of a more
recent decision by the New York Supreme Court. That court in Egan v.
Moore42 enjoined the University of Buffalo from permitting Herbert Ap-
theker, a ranking member of the Communist party, to speak on campus. The
32 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 438 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
33 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See also cases cited notes 7, 17-18,
supra.
34 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
35 Annot., 95 L. Ed 1196 (1951). "As regards freedom from censorship the scope of
the constitutional protection is greater than as regards freedom from punishment."
36 See Meiklejohn, "Free Speech," 65 (1948). "As interests the integrity of public
discussion and care for the public safety are identical." For an answer to the notion of
Meiklejohn and Mr. Justice Black that freedom of speech is an absolute freedom see
Hook, The Paradoxes of Freedom, 13-16 (1962).
37 Hague v. C.I.O., supra note 7, at 515. "Wherever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and from
time out of mind have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions." No like statement could be made of
school auditoriums.
38 See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 388-89.
39 See Marsh v. Alabama, supra note 22.
40 Owners of private facilities would face a threat of economic boycott if the views
were too distasteful to the majority. It is doubtful, however, that this is true in Mr.
Buckley's case.
41 Frantz, supra note 31; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
42 235 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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decision was reached after looking at New York legislation and at judicial
decisions of New York and the United States Supreme Court concerning the
Communist party.43 The court held that the board of trustees of a state
university had to conform its policy to the public policy of the state, which
in New York was firmly opposed to Communists.
Assuming that the case would be upheld on appeal,44 New York appears
to distinguish between speakers belonging to the Communist party and speak-
ers for other controversial minority groups. 45 Such a classification could be
justified by the language of many Supreme Court decisions. Mr. Justice
Jackson, speaking of the "clear and present danger" test, said:
I would save it, unmodified, for application, as a "rule of reason,"
in the kind of case for which it was designed. When the issue is
criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street corner, or circulating
of a few incendiary pamphlets, or parading by zealots behind a
red flag, or refusal of a handful of school children to salute our flag,
it is not beyond the capacity of the judicial process to gather, com-
prehend and weigh the necessary materials for decision whether it
is a clear and present danger of substantive evil or a harmless letting
off of steam. It is not a prophecy, for the danger in such cases
has matured by the time of trial or it was never present .... But
its recent expansion has extended, in particular to Communists,
unprecedented immunities. Unless we are to hold our government
captive in a judge-made verbal trap, we must approach the problem
of a well organized nation-wide conspiracy, . . . as realistically
as our predecessors faced the trivialities that were being prosecuted
until they were checked with a rule of reason.46
It has been argued that an inherent limitation in a democracy is that
the process of majority rule is not subject to majority decision, i.e., that the
majority may not vote to do away with a democracy.47 If this notion is
accepted, it would seem to warrant the silencing of any group which proposed
to replace democracy with another form of government. There would be
no need for a well-informed public on this issue, the raison d'etre for free-
dom of speech, since such a situation is not within the area of popular choice.
To hold that the majority could decide to do away with majority deci-
sions seems to be almost a contradiction of terms,48 and the idea of the
43 Id. at 999.
44 There is some doubt that it would. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937),
appears to be controlling since the court did not even consider the subject matter of the
talk.
45 See also Rockwell v. Morris, supra note 15.
46 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 567 (1951) (concurring opinion). See also
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
47 Van den Haag & Ross, The Fabric of Society, 62 (1958), quoted in Hook, op. cit.
supra note 36, at 132-34.
48 But see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 632, at 673 (1924) (Holmes, CJ., dissenting).
"If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted by the dominating forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their chance and have their way."
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majority giving away the freedom of unborn persons as well as those of
the minority seems shocking. 49 However, there is nothing inherent in the
meaning of a democracy5" that precludes the people from choosing a different
form of government. The possible results may be a reason for criticism
of a democracy as being inadequate to safeguard human freedom, but not
a reason for saying that a democratic system obligates future generations
to preserve it.5 '
It is now accepted that the Communist party is significantly different
from other types of heresy.52 The Communists act in a secretive manner,
placing men in key positions of trust and power instead of relying solely on
arguing in the public forum.5 3 They are therefore not as susceptible to the
ordinary corrective of public discussion.54 The test propounded by Learned
Hand 5 and approved by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the majority,
in Dennis v. United States,56 "the gravity of evil discounted by its improba-
bility," is designed to provide for this distinction. According to this test the
fact that there is no showing of immediacy of harm would no preclude sup-
pression. Words which create a probability of serious danger to occur in
the future could be punished. If the threatened evil was something as serious
as the overthrow of our government by violence, the probability of its
occurrence necessary to justify its proscription would not need to be great.57
Communists have been made subject to restrictions that do not apply
to other Americans. 8 They may be required to disclose their membership59
49 An argument, based on the language of the 9th and 10th Amendments, might be
made that rights reserved to the people and possessed by neither the federal or state
government (See Redlich, "Rights Retained by the People," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 787,
805-07, 1962) could not be taken away from them by majority vote.
50 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1959) defines democracy as: "a
government by the people: rule of the majority."
51 Hook, op. cit. supra note 36, at 136.
52 Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212-13 (1950). "The American Communist
Party is a highly articulated, well contrived organization, numbering thousands of ad-
herents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined, many of whom are infused with a passionate
Utopian faith that is to redeem mankind .... The violent capture of all existing govern-
ments is one article of the creed of that faith, which abjures the possibility of success
by lawful means.... The question before us, and the only one, is how long a government,
having discovered such a conspiracy, must wait."
53 Schmandt, "The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine," I St. Louis L.J. 265, 270-71
(1951).
54 "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (concurring).
55 Dennis v. United States, supra note 52, at 212.
5 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
57 Schmandt, supra note 52.
58 But see In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), a conscientious objector was refused
admission to the practice of law in Illinois; and Clark v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927),
where a city ordinance was upheld which prohibited the issuance of a license to aliens
to operate pool rooms.
59 Wilkenson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1960); Braden v. United States, 365
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or the names of others with whom they associate,60 while those in other
organizations may not.61 A Communist may be prohibited from being a
union official 62 or a teacher in the public school system.63 He may not be
able to obtain a place on the ballot6 4 or to work for the state or any of its
political subdivisions.65
It does not follow from this that Communists in America have no rights,
or that Egan v. Moore was correctly decided. The above situations may be
distinguished from Egan by weighing the interests involved. The probability
of harm arising from a subversive being in a position where he could order
strikes or from having a Communist agent teaching in the classroom every
day is much greater than the danger from a one-shot speaking appearance on
a college campus.
In cases where a person was punished for failure to answer questions
asked by a congressional committee, the refusal to answer hindered the com-
mittee in obtaining facts for possible legislation. In investigating communist
infiltration in Southern industry66 or in education6 7 it would seem a proper
subject of inquiry as to whether persons involved in these areas were
Communists. Even so had the person questioned chosen to invoke the fifth
amendment as a basis for his refusal to answer, he would have been pro-
tected; instead the refusal was based on first amendment grounds. In view
of this possible means of escape, the impact of being asked such questions
would not seem to outweigh the governmental interest in obtaining relevant
factual bases for future legislation.
The prohibition against working for the government, even in positions
where no security breach is possible, could be explained on the basis of a
conflict of interest.6 8 One of the communist aims is replacement of the
existing form of government. Since anything that would strengthen the
established form of government would make its replacement more difficult,
his work in carrying out the aims of his government employer would conflict
with his work as a party member.
There must be some causal connection between the activity prohibited
U.S. 431 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See also In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) ; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
60 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
61 N.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
62 By denying the benefits conferred by the Management Labor Relations Act to
Unions whose officers are affiliated with the Communist Party. American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
63 Adlef v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
64 Gerande v. Election Bd., 341 U.S. 56 (1951). See also U.S. Constitution art. 2 § 1
and art. 6, requiring members of Congress, members of the state legislatures, and all
executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and the states, to take an oath to
support the Constitution.
65 Garner v. Los Angeles Bd., 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
66 Wilkenson v. United States and Braden v. United States, supra note 59.
67 Barenblatt v. United States, supra note 59.
68 See Hook, Political Power and Personal Freedom, 271-74 (1959).
[Vol. 24
1963] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 557
and the evil which the government is attempting to avoid.69 Since the Egan
case ignores the topic of Mr. Aptheker's talk, it apparently holds that no
member of the Communist party may make a speech on the campus of a
state university. 70 It may be that the Communists are so ingenious that they
are able to use an appearance and talk on any subject to further their illegal
ends.71 In the absence of such a finding, however, the situation seems indis-
tinguishable from that in Buckley.
G9 De Jonge v. Oregon, supra note 44.
70 See Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 335-36.
71 See Hook, op. cit. supra note 68, at 300.
